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Online Gambling, Regulation, and Risks: A Comparison of
Gambling Policies in Finland and the Netherlands
ALAN LITTLER* AND JOHANNA JÄRVINEN-TASSOPOULOS
L’objectif de cet article est de comparer les différentes approches à la réglementation
adoptées par la Finlande et les Pays-Bas face aux pressions exercées par le droit de
l’Union européenne, le jeu non autorisé et les effets nocifs qui peuvent naître du jeu.
Les deux pays membres utilisent deux modèles de réglementation du jeu différents:
selon Kingma, les modèles renvoient à des attitudes et préoccupations distinctes
suscitées par le jeu à des périodes différentes. Selon nous, en ce qui concerne la
réglementation du jeu, la Finlande colle à un « modèle qui sert d’alibi », alors que les
Pays-Bas adoptent un « modèle axé sur le risque ». Les deux pays ont décidé de
restreindre le mouvement transfrontalier des services de jeu, même si la Finlande a
opté pour un système de monopole et les Pays-Bas se dirigent vers un système d’octroi
de permis. Nous adoptons l’approche à plusieurs volets (Multiple Streams Approach)
pour expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles la Finlande et les Pays-Bas ont pris des
avenues politiques et législatives différentes. Pendant de nombreuses années, les
politiques finnoises relatives au jeu ont dirigé la demande vers les sites nationaux de
jeu en ligne. Les Pays-Bas tentent plutôt de diriger 80 % de la demande vers les
opérateurs en ligne locaux autorisés. Les deux pays membres poursuivent les mêmes
objectifs, soit protéger les consommateurs du jeu compulsif en réduisant la présence
des opérateurs non autorisés sur leurs marchés nationaux respectifs.
The purpose of this article is to compare the different regulatory approaches taken by
Finland and the Netherlands in response to the pressures of European Union law,
unlicensed gambling, and the harmful effects which can arise from gambling. The two
Member States represent two different models of gambling regulation. According to
Kingma, the models refer to different attitudes and concerns towards gambling in
different timeframes. We argue that Finland fits the “alibi model” of gambling
regulation, whereas the Netherlands aligns with the “risk model”. Both countries have
decided to restrict the cross-border movement of gambling services, even though
Finland has opted for a monopoly system and the Netherlands is heading towards a
licensing system. We employ the “Multiple Streams Approach” to explain why Finland
and the Netherlands have taken different political and legislative paths in the regulation
of gambling services. For several years, Finnish gambling policy has focused on
channeling demand towards domestic online gambling sites, which have been
represented as more secure than foreign online gambling sites. The Netherlands seeks
to channel 80 percent of demand to locally licensed online operators. Both Finland and
the Netherlands seek the same objective: to protect consumers from the excesses of
gambling in part by reducing the presence of unlicensed operators in their respective
national markets.
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THIS ARTICLE COMPARES THE DIFFERENT REGULATORY approaches taken by
Finland and the Netherlands in response to the pressures created by of European Union (EU)
law, unlicensed gambling, and the harmful effects that arise from gambling. Whilst consumer
protection and the prevention of gambling addiction are central objectives of gambling
regulation in both countries, these states have addressed these objectives through the
development of significantly different regulatory regimes. Existing law in the Netherlands
places a prohibition on unlicensed gambling whilst lacking a legal basis for the regulator to
award licenses for online gambling. Legislative proposals seek to dissolve the considerable de
facto gambling market and introduce a licensing regime which will not put a cap on the number
of licences available.1 On the other hand, Finland has maintained a monopoly system that
includes both land-based and online gambling, despite the liberalization of gambling markets
in other EU Member States and detailed scrutiny under EU law and its regulatory approach.2
In this paper, we ask why the Netherlands and Finland have taken different political and
legislative pathswith respect to gambling regulation, despite similar pressures from
technological developments and the EU.
The internet has “transformed not only the traditional ways of providing gambling,
but also the established approaches to gambling regulation.”3 EU Member States have
responded differently to the emergence of online gambling. The United Kingdom liberalized
its online gambling market in 2007.4 It is “actively encouraging [internet gambling providers]
to establish operations on its shores.”5 In 2010, France opened its online gambling market to
outside providers, who required state authorization state to offer horse and sports betting and
poker online.6 Monopolies for sports betting and horserace betting were maintained in the landbased sphere. The French system compels online gambling providers to conform to consumer
protection laws, but it also offers a “competitive alternative to unlicensed gambling.”7 Denmark
has recently opted for controlled liberalization of online gambling by allowing some games to
be organized by operators other than the monopolist Danske Spil.8 2018 has also seen Sweden,
after several years of debate, move towards opening up the online market to locally licensed
operators. Under the new regulatory system, the Swedish online gambling market would be
divided into three sections: in the first section, the state would have exclusive rights, the second
section would be open for all gambling companies, and the third section would be held by the
non-profit sector.9 Sweden follows a general trend amongst EU Member States, such as
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, Romania, and Spain—all of which have
opened their online markets to private operators over the past few years.
1

Sally Gainsbury, Internet Gambling: Current Research Findings and Implications (New York: Springer, 2012)
at 56.
2
Antti Myllymaa, The Political Economy of Online Gambling in the European Union (Doctoral Thesis, University
of Helsinki Department of Economic and Political Studies, 2017).
3
Natalia Zborowska, Sytze F. Kingma & Phill Brear, “Regulation and Reputation: The Gibraltar approach” in
Robert J. Williams, Robert T. Wood & Jonathan Parke, eds, Routledge International Handbook of Internet
Gambling (London & New York: Routledge, 2012) at 84.
4
Gainsbury, supra note 1 at 31.
5
Betsi Beem & John Mikler, “National regulations for a borderless industry: US versus UK approaches to online
gambling” (2011) 30:3 Policy & Society 161 at 174.
6
Virve Marionneau, Socio-cultural contexts of gambling: A comparative study of Finland and France (Doctoral
Thesis, University of Helsinki Department of Social Research, 2015).
7
Virve Marionneau & Johanna Järvinen-Tassopoulos, “Consumer protection in licensed online gambling markets
in France: The role of responsible gambling tools” (2017) 25:6 Addiction Research & Theory 436 at 442.
8
Myllymaa, supra note 2.
9
Jenny Cisneros Örnberg & Jörgen Hettne, “The Future Swedish Gambling Market: Challenges in Law and Public
Policies” in Michael Egerer, Virve Marionneau & Janne Nikkinen, eds, Gambling Policies in European Welfare
States: Current Challenges and Future Prospects (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) at 198.
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Technology has allowed several jurisdictions (e.g. Alderney, the Isle of Man,
Gibraltar, and Malta) to serve as “regulatory hubs” from where online gambling operators
receive licenses and then “export” their gambling services to other EU Member States.10 While
technological advances have driven changes to gambling opportunities and modalities, it also
provides opportunities to mitigate the negative externalities associated with online gambling.
This dual aspect of the impact of technology on gambling has not occurred in the vacuum of
cyberspace. Rather, it has occurred against the backdrop of regulatory regimes of various EU
Member States as well as developments in EU law.
In common with other economic activities, the ability of Member States to regulate
gambling within their respective jurisdictions must take into account the fundamental
principles of EU law as established in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
and general principles of EU law. From the early 1990s onwards there has been a stream of
case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) shaping the application of
EU law to national-level gambling rules and regulations. Member States’ regulatory regimes
had to respond to problems arising from both online gambling and the scrutiny of their
regulatory requirements under EU law.
We begin by situating the regulatory approaches takes by the Netherlands and Finland
within the different models of gambling regulation developed by the Dutch sociologist Sytze
Kingma.11 During this exercise, we will draw on data derived from national legislation and
legislative proposals, national reports, EU case law, and policy documentation. From here, we
will outline the Multiple Streams Approach (“MSA”) as a framework to explain how national
governments make policies under conditions of ambiguity and to understand gambling-related
public policy.12 We use the Multiple Streams Approach, because we view online gambling as
a “policy problem” in both Finland and the Netherlands. This framework enables us to analyse
policy developments in both countries and the solutions that have been turned into policies.13
We then turn our attention to EU law, unlicensed cross-border gambling, and the harmful
effects of gambling before applying the MSA to understand how both jurisdictions have
responded to these pressures. Finally, we draw attention to similarities and discrepancies
between Finland and the Netherlands.

I. SITUATING FINLAND AND THE NETHERLANDS: ALIBI
AND RISK MODELS OF GAMBLING REGULATION
Governments regulate gambling in accordance with national policy preferences and standards.
While gambling involves risks to consumers, it is regulated for reasons other than protecting
consumers and the prevention of gambling addiction. States regulate gambling in order to
prevent crime associated with gambling, combat money laundering, and generate revenues for
the treasury or good causes.

10

Zborowska, Kingma & Brear, supra note 3 at 88.
Sytze Kingma, “Gambling and the risk society: the liberalization and legitimation crisis of gambling in the
Netherlands” (2004) 4:1 International Gambling Studies 47; Sytze F Kingma, “The liberalization and
(re)regulation of Dutch gambling markets: National consequences of the changing European context” (2008) 2:4
Regulation & Governance 445.
12
See John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed (New York: Longman, 2003).
13
See Paul Cairney & Michael J Jones, “Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach: What Is the Empirical Impact of
this Universal Theory?” (2016) 44:1 Policy Studies J at 40.
11
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In previous gambling studies, scholars have argued that the liberalization of gambling
markets has led the regulatory focus to shift “from a rule-based mode towards a risk-based
mode of regulation” or in other words, from “a monopoly situation in which the operator is
severely constrained” to a different regulatory situation.14 Kingma has discerned three models
of regulation, the prohibition model, alibi model, and risk model, that represent different
attitudes towards gambling, regulatory approaches, and concerns regarding gambling operation
in different timeframes.15
In comparing gambling and regulatory developments in Finland and the Netherlands,
we focus on the most recent models, the alibi model and the risk model. The typical features
of the alibi model are: gambling can be legalized to avoid illegal markets; the exploitation of
gambling was severely restricted by discouraging the private pursuit of profit; and gambling
revenues were allocated to social interests, in terms of welfare, sports, and other “just causes.”
On the other hand, the typical features of the risk model are: a liberal political consensus on
the legitimacy of gambling as commercial entertainment; acknowledgement of the economic
importance of the gambling sector; and control of gambling markets, primarily to confront the
risks of addiction and crime.16 In Table 1, we highlight the key characteristics of these models
and their relationship to Finland and the Netherlands. We argue that while Finland more closely
fits the “alibi model”, the Netherlands aligns with the “risk model” of gambling regulation.
Table 1. Models of gambling regulation in Finland and the Netherlands

Time frame
Moral meaning of
gambling
Political strategy
Rationale for gambling
law
Destination of returns
Central concern

Exploitation
Controlling institutions
Ideal type state

Alibi model/
Finland
2000s onwards
It is a potentially harmful
activity
Status quo
Prevention of gambling
harms and crime
Good causes
Competition from unlicensed
cross-border gambling
operators, loss of gambling
proceeds
Monopoly system
Legislation and gambling
administration
The welfare state

Risk model/
The Netherlands
1990s onwards
It is entertainment
Consensus
Gambling markets are
economically important
Private profit is also allowed
External effects like
gambling excesses and
problem gambling
High-risk organizations
Scientific research and
health care
The risk society

The alibi model of gambling regulation is clearly evident in Finland. From the early
2000s onwards, gambling has been framed as a potentially harmful activity. Problem gambling
started to be considered a social problem.17 In 2007, thegovernment, led by Prime Minister
Matti Vanhanen, stated in its programme that it will act on social problems related to problem
gambling, fight criminal activity, maintain the monopoly system, and guarantee enough
14

Zborowska, Kingma & Brear, supra note 3 at 86-87.
Kingma (2008), supra note 11.
16
Ibid.
17
Tuukka Tammi, “The form and transformation of gambling policy in Finland” in Pauliina Raento, ed, Gambling
in Finland: Themes and Data for Qualitative Research (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2014) at 77.
15
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resources to tackle unregulated gambling.18 Since then, the major protective measures have
been the consolidation of the age limit of gambling to 18 years and a marketing ban on foreign
gambling providers. Maintaining the monopoly system has long been a priority in Finland and
the legislation has been reformed in order to limit the impact of unlicensed gambling operators
in Finland. First, the three national gambling operators’ licenses were legalized.19 Later these
three operators merged and a new state-owned company, Veikkaus, was given monopoly to
operate in Finland.20
Finland is part of a group of “social democratic states, where entitlement is based on
citizenship principles and where the objective is a high level of universal protection against
social risks.”21 As funding of social and health organizations is considered a “good cause”,
gambling proceeds are important from a welfare perspective. Without gambling proceeds,
many good causes would have to be funded via taxation and charity. The concept of “common
good” can be linked to “approval and support for the welfare state”, but the outcome of the
organization of the common good depends on how social equality and welfare are
comprehended.22 In the Finnish view, the state and civic society are allied, not in conflict.
Finnish civic society exists in the form of associations and club activities, non-profit
organizations that are rather close to the state.23
In contrast to Finland, the Netherlands has seen the risk model replace the alibi model
of gambling regulation. Gambling is no longer considered a vice, and the Netherlands has
moved towards liberalization of the gambling market and a more flexible approach to gambling
policies. Both the modernization of gambling practices and services and the political and
operational acknowledgement of gambling addiction and its consequences are part of the
Dutch risk model.24
Games of chance are regulated pursuant to the Wet op de kansspelen 1964 (“Betting
and Gaming Act”) which Fijnaut describes as “hopelessly complex”.25 Kingma’s classification
of the Netherlands as a risk model of regulation arose while the de facto prohibition on online
gambling prevailed. State monopolies provided gambling services (e.g. the national lottery,
casino gambling) and the role of private operators was limited. The Netherlands has since seen
the expansion of state-operated gambling in the area of sports betting, which stands in contrast
to 2016 government statements to the effect that it was not the task of the state to provide
Johanna Järvinen-Tassopoulos, “Rahapelipolitiikkaa eurooppalaisissa raameissa” [Gambling Policy in the
European Context] in Mikko Niemelä & Juho Saari, eds, Politiikan polut ja hyvinvointivaltion muutos (Helsinki:
Kelan tutkimusosasto, 2011) at 272.
19
L575/2011; See Johanna Järvinen-Tassopoulos, “Gambling, policy issues and the public good: The case of
Finland” in Matilda Hellman, Gun Roos & Julius von Wright, eds, A Welfare Policy Patchwork: Negotiating the
Public Good in Times of Transition (Helsinki: Nordic Centre for Welfare and Social Issues, 2012) at 86.
20
Jukka Tukia & Elina Rydman, “The transition of the Finnish gambling system” in Johanna JärvinenTassopoulos, ed, State of Play 2017: A Review of Gambling in Finland (Helsinki: National Institute for Health
and Welfare, 2018) 19 at 20.
21
Peter Taylor-Gooby, “New Risks and Social Change” in Peter Taylor-Gooby, ed, New Risks, New Welfare: The
Transformation of the European Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 13.
22
Johanna Järvinen-Tassopoulos & Risto Eräsaari, “Conceptions of the Common Good” in Egerer, Marionneau
& Nikkinen, supra note 9 at 266.
23
Timo Rusanen, “Challenging the Risk Society: The Case of Finland” (2002) 24:2 Science Communication 202
at 203.
24
Kingma, “Gambling and the Risk Society,” supra note 11 at 64.
25
Cyrille Fijnaut, “Changes Large and Small in Dutch Policy on Gambling” in Alan Littler et al, eds, In the
Shadow of Luxembourg: EU and National Developments in the Regulation of Gambling (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2011) at 210.
18
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gambling services, made during These statements were made during a debate over a pending
bill before the Senate, which will end the monopoly on the provision of casino services enjoyed
since 1974 by the state-owned casino operator, Holland Casino, and privatize the company.26
Furthermore, since 2016 the Senate has been considering a legislative proposal that would
enable private operators to obtain a licence to lawfully provide their online gambling services,
subject to national regulatory preferences and standards.27 Only when the specific details of
the regulatory regime are known, following the publication of secondary legislation for
consultation, can a detailed analysis be done on how such legislation aligns itself with the risk
model. However, it is not anticipated that it will reverse the prevailing direction of travel.
The alibi and risk models offer ideal type visions of gambling practices, policies, and
concerns in Finland and the Netherlands. The two main differences are in the moral meaning
of gambling and the political strategy (including exploitation). Nevertheless, both societies
have undergone changes and their welfare systems have been influenced by values such as
freedom of choice and individual responsibility.28 These changes have also affected attitudes
towards gambling and prevailing gambling cultures. The internet and especially online
gambling are good examples of the contradiction between the apparent freedom of choice
offered to gamblers by numerous gambling operators and efforts to prevent gambling harms
promoted by responsible states and other stakeholders.

II. THE MULTIPLE STREAMS APPROACH
We used Kingma’s models of gambling regulation as a starting point in our analysis of the
regulatory response to online gambling in Finland and the Netherlands. Now, in order to
explain why the Netherlands and Finland have taken different political and legislative paths in
relation to gambling regulation, we employ the MSA.
According to Zahariadis, the MSA seeks to “[explain] how policies are made by
national governments under conditions of ambiguity.”29 Ambiguity refers to the existence of
many ways of thinking about the same circumstances or phenomena—ways of thinking that
may not be reconcilable.30 The MSA is “applied to understand public policy at the system level,
modeling context to understand specific policy decisions”31, and “it yields insight into the
dynamics of an entire policy process—agenda setting, decision-making, and

26

Netherlands, Tweede Kamer, Wijziging van de Wet op de kansspelen in verband met de modernisering van het
speelcasinoregime: Memorie van toelichting [Amendment of the Betting and Gaming Act in connection with the
modernization of the gaming casino regime: Explanatory Memorandum] 34 471 no 3 (2015-2016).
27
Netherlands, Tweede Kamer, Voorstel van wet: Wijziging van de Wet op de kansspelen, de Wet op de
kansspelbelasting en enkele andere wetten in verband met het organiseren van kansspelen op afstand [Bill:
Amendment of the Betting and Gaming Act, the Betting and Gaming Tax Act and some other laws relating to the
organization of remote games of chance] (2013-2014), 33 996 no 2, 24 July 2014, online
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-33996-2.html> and Memorie van toelichting [Explanatory
memorandum]
(2013-2014),
33
996
no
3,
24
July
2014,
online
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/dossier/33996/kst-33996-3?resultIndex=138&sorttype=1&sortorder=4.
28
Anja Eleveld & Olaf van Vliet, “The Dutch Welfare State: Recent Reforms in Social Security and Labour Law”
(2013) 4 Diritto Pubblico Comparato Ed Europeo at 1371.
29
Nikolaos Zahariadis, “Ambiguity and Multiple Streams” in Paul Sabatier & Christopher Weible, eds, Theories
of the Policy Process (Boulder: Westview Press, 2014) at 25; Evangelia Petridou, “Theories of the Policy Process:
Contemporary Scholarship and Future Directions” (2014) 42:S1 Policy Studies J at S21.
30
Zahariadis, supra note 29 at 26.
31
Michael D Jones et al, “A River Runs Through It: A Multiple Streams Meta-Review” (2016) 44:1 Policy Studies
J at 14.
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implementation.”32 MSA examines three streams of input into policy decisions making has:
the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream (see Fig. 1). In Kingdon’s theory,
the three streams develop and operate independently of one another, but: “these separate
streams come together at critical times. A problem is recognized, a solution is available [and]
the political climate makes the time is right for change… ”.33
The problem stream considers how the problem comes to the fore. Policy makers only
become aware of a small number of problems, sometimes because of dramatic events or
recognition that a potential solution has already been developed in a different context. 34In the
MSA model (Figure 1), “indicators” refers to actors who identify and monitor potential
problems and to different rates and ratios (e.g. unemployment rate, increasing costs). “Focusing
events” are attached to particular problems and provide impetus for action or change. “Load”
is related to the capacity of institutions to deal with problems and “feedback” is information
provided by programs related to the problem.35
The policy stream considers which possibilities for policy action or inaction get
identified, assessed, and narrowed down to feasible options.36 Viable solutions take time to
develop; different actors consider and reconsider policy solutions as some issues take time to
become accepted within policy networks.37 Many potential policy solutions originate with
communities of policy makers, experts, and lobby groups.38 “Value acceptability” refers to
proposals that survive because they conform to existing values. “Resource adequacy” refers to
whether the resources required to implement the proposal are obtainable, and network
integration” is the extent to which an idea achieves proliferation or extinction.39
The politics stream considers why and how policy makers work to find a solution.
Factors that influence the nation, such as executive or legislative turnover, and interest group
advocacy campaigns can be relevant here.40 They can cause fluctuations in public opinion.41
Policy makes have to consider many factors, including their own beliefs, and the feedback they
receive from interest groups and political parties.42 “National mood” refers to the general
orientation of the public toward issues or values relevant to the policy problem. “Party
ideology” refers to the orientation of political parties within relevant institutions. “Balance of
interests” refers to the position of relevant interests.43
Policy windows are opportunities for change – policy entrepreneurs make the most of
those opportunities. The opening of a policy window can be predictable or unpredictable; they
open infrequently and do not stay open long.44 The opening can be caused by the appearance

32

Zahariadis, supra note 29 at 25.
Kingdon, supra note 12 at 88.
34
Daniel Béland & Michael Howlett, “The Role and Impact of the Multiple-Streams Approach in Comparative
Policy Analysis” (2016) 18:3 J Comparative Policy Analysis at 222.
35
Jones et al, supra note 31 at 15.
36
Béland & Howlett, supra note 344 at 222.
37
Cairney & Jones, supra note 13 at 40.
38
Michael Howlett, Allan McConnell & Anthony Perl, “Streams and stages: Reconciling Kingdon and policy
process theory” (2015) 54.3 European J Political Research 420 at 421.
39
Jones et al, supra note 31 at 16.
40
Béland & Howlett, supra note 34 at 222.
41
Howlett, McConnell & Perl, supra note 38 at 421.
42
Cairney & Jones, supra note 13 at 40.
43
Jones et al, supra note 311 at 16.
44
Kingdon, supra note 12 165-166.
33
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of compelling problems or changes in the politics stream.45 As Kingdon puts it, “[p]olicy
entrepreneurs play a major part in the coupling at the open policy window, attaching solutions
to problems, overcoming the constraints by redrafting protocols, and taking advantage of
politically propitious events.”46 Policy entrepreneurs can be elected officials, civil servants,
lobbyists, academics, or journalists.47
Figure 1. Diagram of Multiple Streams Approach48
Problem Stream
Indicators
Focusing Events
Feedback
Load

Policy Window
Coupling Logic
Decision Style
Institutional Content

Politics Stream
Party Ideology
National Mood
Balance of Interests

Policy Stream
Value Accessibility
Technical Feasibility
Resource Adequacy
Network Integration
Policy Community

Policy
Outputs

Policy Entrepreneurs
Access
Resources
Strategies

III. THE POLICY CONTEXT OF ONLINE GAMBLING
REGULATION
In order to understand external pressures operating on choices about the regulatory approach
to gambling, this section first addresses the contexts established by EU law, unlicensed crossborder gambling as an embodiment of the implications of technology, and the harmful effects
of gambling. From there, we then explore how Finland and the Netherlands have responded to
these pressures.

A. COMPLYING WITH EU LAW
Whilst Member States have taken different regulatory approaches when organizing and
regulating their gambling markets, the “vast majority of European countries have opted to
legalize, regulate, and tax all forms of online gambling.”49 Finland and the Netherlands fall
within this majority. While free movement of gambling services means services originating in
45

Ibid at 194.
Ibid at 165-166.
47
Ibid at 204.
48
Jones et al, supra note 31 at 15.
49
George Häberling, “Internet Gambling Policy in Europe” in Williams, Wood & Parke, supra note 3 at 284.
46
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one EU Member state can cross borders to other customers in other EU Member states,
Member states are also able to restrict the cross-border entry of services entering their territory,
provided that they do so in a manner which is compliant with EU law.50 Different forms of
domestic regulation restricting cross-border offerings range from those with the greatest
impact, such as an outright prohibition on online gambling or reserving such activities to a
publicly owned state monopolist with a perpetual license, to the lighter regulation provided by
a licensing regime without a cap on the number of licenses available.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has been particularly lenient
towards Member States’s regulation of gambling, as long as national laws do not discriminate
on the basis of nationality or place of establishment. 51 Having recognised a “sufficient degree
of latitude” enjoyed by Member States when regulating gambling,52 the relatively light-touch
approach of the CJEU has provided considerable leeway to Member States. When assessing
whether a restrictive measure is compatible with EU law, the CJEU must be satisfied that the
regulation is necessarily restrictive for the public interest. Protecting consumers from gambling
addiction and preventing gambling operators from inciting consumers to squander money on
gambling have both been recognised by the CJEU as a basis to restrict the cross-border
movement of gambling services.53
In relation to online gambling, the CJEU recognised that “the characteristics specific
to the offer of games of chance by the internet may prove to be a source of risks of a different
kind and a greater order in the area of consumer protection, particularly in relation to young
persons and those with a propensity for gambling or likely to develop such a propensity, in
comparison with traditional markets for such games.” 54 Restrictive measures must also be
“consistent and systematic” meaning the measure should not be applied in a way which
contradicts its purpose.55 Furthermore, the necessity of the measure must be considered in a
dynamic, rather than a static way. The question may thus arise whether a particular measure,
established with a view to preventing excessive gambling and addiction and seen as justified
in 2007 remains justifiable a decade later, once new technological tools that could help secure
the Member State’s regulatory objectives are considered.
Member States must also ensure that the entire regulatory regime is horizontally
consistent, meaning that regulatory approaches for each market segment should be consistent
with each other. For example, in the name of preventing gambling addiction, a Member State
cannot subject a riskier form of gambling to a less stringent regulatory approach while another
segment of the market with a lower risk profile is subject to a more burdensome regulatory
50

See Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2015).
See Wolf Sauter & Jurian Langer, “The Consistency Requirement in EU Internal Market Law: Last Refuge of
the Unimaginative or Legal Standard for Rational Administration?” (Discussion Paper, Tilburg Law and
Economics Center, 2016-2017); Dimitrios Doukas, “In a bet there is a fool and a state monopoly: Are the odds
stacked against cross-border gambling?” (2011) 36:2 European L Rev 243; Alan Littler, Member States versus
the European Union: The Regulation of Gambling (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishing, 2011); Alan Littler,
“Internet Based Trade and the Court of Justice: Different Sector, Different Attitude” (2011) 1 European J Risk
Regulation 78; Stefaan Van de Bogaert & Armin Cuvyers, “‘Money for nothing’: The case law of the EU Court
of Justice on the regulation of gambling” (2011) 48:4 Common Market L Rev 1175; Julia Hörnle & Birgitte
Zammit, Cross-border Online Gambling Law & Policy (Cheltenham & Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2010); Alan
Littler, “Regulatory Perspectives on the Future of Interactive Gambling in the Internal Market” (2008) 33:2
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approach.56 Whilst this principle may provide opportunities to challenge prevailing regulatory
approaches, it can also pose difficulties when a Member State is considering change to only
one segment of a national market.
The phased reform of the entire Dutch gambling market illustrates the problem of
the horizontal consistency requirement. The Netherlands introduced a licensing regime for
online gambling, liberalized and privatized the casino sector, and opened up — to a degree
— the land-based lottery sector. The Council of State (a constitutional advisory body)
observed that having different regulatory regimes within the overall national market could
conflict with the requirement of horizontal consistency:
[It] is possible under European law to introduce a licensing
system for remote games of chance as intended, but such
regulation could have consequences for those market segments
which are subject to stricter regulation … In light of the
European legal framework, the question arises as to whether the
intended step of introducing a licensing system for remote games
of chance will lead to (much) less restrictive policies being
introduced for other market segments.57
Given its role as guardian of the treaties, the European Commission has the power to
commence infringement proceedings against Member States in relation to their gambling
policies.. In 2006, such proceedings were started against a group of Member States including
Finland and the Netherlands.58 Ultimately, the proceedings against Finland were closed in
November 2013 when the European Commission was satisfied that the Finnish regime
complied with the requirements of EU law.59 Proceedings against the Netherlands were closed
in December 2017, as part of the European Commission’s decision to close all such pending
procedures in relation to gambling.60
While the infringement proceedings were pending, the European Commission took a
number of initiatives in the field. In 2011, it undertook a fact finding mission and published a
Green Paper entitled ‘On on-line gambling in the Internal Market’.61 This was followed by a
Communication in October 2012 identifying five priority areas, one of which was “protecting
consumers and citizens, minors and vulnerable groups.”62 This resulted in first legislative
measure to arise following the Green Paper, albeit a non-binding one: the Recommendation on

See Markus Stoss v Kulpa Automatenservice Asperg GmbH v Baden‑ Württemberg, Joined Cases C-316/07, C409/07 & C-410/07 [2010] ECR I-08069.
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EC, Free movement of services: Commission inquiry into restrictions on sports betting services in Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden [4 April 2006], IP/06/436.
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EC, Commission requests Member States to comply with EU law when regulating gambling services [20
November 2013], IP/13/1101.
60
EC, Commission closes infringement proceedings and complaints in the gambling sector [7 December 2017],
IP/17/5109.
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[23 March 2011], COM (2011) 128.
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EC, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social
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COM(2012) 596 at 5, online https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52012DC0596.
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Principles for the Protection of Consumers, in July 2014.63 Although a Recommendation is not
legally binding and does not confer rights upon individual gamblers, “national courts are bound
to take [them] into consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to them.”64 The
Recommendation recognizes that “[a]ll citizens should enjoy a high level of common
protection throughout the internal market” and aims to create a “high level of consumer
protection”65 However, despite references to a “high level of protection”, no definition or
quantification is provided, leaving the standards open to interpretation. In addition to these
moves by the European Commission, the European Parliament also issued a number of
recommendations in 2009,66 2011,67 and 2013.68
When establishing a regulatory response to online gambling, Finland and the
Netherlands are obligated to act within the space created by the application of EU law, and also
the caselaw of the CJEU. This obligation applies to Member State’s efforts to protect
consumers in accordance with national regulatory preferences and standards and to their
attempts to respond to the challenges posed by technology.

B. UNLICENSED CROSS-BORDER GAMBLING
“Unlicensed cross-border gambling” refers to both online gambling that is unlicensed and
unregulated, and to online gambling that is licensed in one jurisdiction and offered on a crossborder basis to another jurisdiction. The term does not refer to “illegal gambling operations”
which is often a reference to organized crime.69 Locally unlicensed cross-border gambling may
very well be regulated in the country of origin. Depending on the jurisdiction, the online
gambling provider will likely be subject to a variety of requirements in its own jurisdiction,
with objectives similar to the ones Finland applies, and the ones Netherlands intends to apply.
However, the standard of consumer protection, for instance, may differ between the originating
jurisdiction and the jurisdiction in which the service is offered. The same observation holds
true in terms of regulatory oversight of the licence holder. In this section, we consider how
Finland and the Netherlands have responded to unlicensed cross-border gambling.
1. FINLAND
Online gambling became a political issue in Finland in the 1990s. The gambling company,
Veikkaus, which offered lottery games, scratch cards, and betting, was the first of the three
Finnish gambling companies to go online in 1997. At the same time, competition from foreign
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Market, [2013] OJ, C 153/35.
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companies such as Centrebet, Expekt, Ladbrokes, and Unibet was increasing.70 The detailed
explanation of the government proposal (197/2001) to Parliament preceding the second
Lotteries Act, stated that participation in foreign-based gambling would not be prohibited in
the new regime.[71] Thus, Finnish citizens were allowed to gamble online, but the state was
still eager to prevent the operation and marketing of games provided by gambling operators
based abroad. The second Lotteries Act applies to gambling operations abroad insofar as they
are sold or transmitted in Finland, and to those operated in the Åland islands insofar as they are
sold or transmitted in continental Finland.72
Heikkilä, Laine, and Salo claim that the location of the operation and transmission of
gambling depends on the identity of the concerned party.73 From a foreign gambling company’s
perspective, the selling of games happens in their state of residence and thus it is not in breach
of the law. On the other hand, a regulatory official’s perspective may be different: the selling
of games on the internet happens where the gambler is. If a foreign gambling company does
not prevent gamblers in Finland from playing online, it has broken the law. Also, if the foreign
gambling company has directed its offer towards Finland (e.g. by providing services in
Finnish), this is a further justification that the sale happened in Finland.
In 2016, it was estimated that Finns spent €170 million on games offered by foreign
based gambling operators, including the operator PAF. This sum accounts for almost 9 percent
of the Finnish gambling market.74 Between 2006 and 2016, the amount spent gambling abroad
has fluctuated. The opening of RAY’s online casino in 2010 and the decline of the online poker
boom around the same time are some of the reasons that can explain the fluctuation.75 The
casino in particular can be linked to the launch of online poker by the Swedish state-owned
operator Svenska Spel in 2006, which led to a public discussion about a similar move in
Finland, given the popularity of online poker among Finns. At first, RAY and the Finnish
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health were opposed to the suggestion, arguing that online
gambling would increase gambling problems. Yet in 2009, the idea was endorsed by a working
group, created by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior to reform the Finnish gambling
legislation. Soon after, RAY applied for a license to operate online. This policy decision
involved responding to the loss of gambling proceed to foreign firms, by entering a national
firm in the competition for Finnish online customers.
Marketing of gambling services by unlicensed gambling providers is common in
Finland. Advertising is online, in social media, and even in e-mails or text messages.76 The
Finnish National Police Board has the jurisdiction to prohibit marketing of unlicensed
gambling services, but it is challenging to intervene in the case of online gambling. The
government proposal argued that by developing Finnish legislation it would be possible to
prevent foreign gambling offers as gambling services diversify, and to this end Finland has
Jenny Cisneros Örnberg & Tuukka Tammi, “Gambling problems as a political framing: Safeguarding the
monopolies in Finland and Sweden” (2011) 26 J Gambling Issues 110; Tuukka Tammi, Sari Castrén & Tomi
Lintonen, “Gambling in Finland: Problem gambling in the context of a national monopoly in the European Union”
(2015) 110:5 Addiction 746.
71
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chosen to develop new gambling forms like fantasy sports and eSports.77 Yet there are still a
lot of online gambling sites that provide services in Finnish. These sites can offer more enticing
bonuses than the state-owned Finnish gambling operator Veikkaus, which is bound to gambling
rules set by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior.78
2. THE NETHERLANDS
In contrast to Finland, online gambling is not legally offered in the Netherlands at this time.
Various monopolies prevail in the land-based sphere. though some of their services, most
notably sports betting and horserace betting, are available online through an e-commerce
exception. In 2011, the Dutch government released a policy statement sent a strong signal that
the government was prepared to move away from the approach of one operator per category of
gambling, while still upholding the established policy objectives of national gambling law: the
prevention of gambling addiction, the protection of consumers, and combatting criminality and
illegality. However, discussions since 2011 have been marked by an absence, from a policymaking perspective, of attempts to p land-based monopolies into the remote sphere.
Despite this, there is still active participation in locally unlicensed online games of
chance. Research conducted in 2004 found that while postal communications accounted for
more than 50 percent of participation in foreign or remote gambling, the popularity of the
internet had greatly increased compared to two years prior.79 A 2009 report found that 9.6
percent of the population had participated in illegal games of chance and 5.1 percent had
participated in games of chance via the internet.80 The report also noted a shift from illegal
casinos to illegal online gambling over the past decade.81 A further report concluded that the
percentage of residents of the Netherlands who had participated in online gambling had risen
from 1.4 percent in 2005 to 3.3 percent in 2011, reaching approximately 257,000 residents.82
Locally unlicensed online gambling offers in the Netherlands have long been a point
of contention. However, the first enforcement measures, in Huls’ view “ironically”, were
actually civil cases initiated in 2002 by the holder of the sports betting monopoly, De Lotto,
against operators accessing the Dutch market on the basis of licences awarded elsewhere in the
EU. 83 There was no centralised response from government at that time.
Two preliminary references were made from Dutch courts to the CJEU. In the first
reference, the issue was transparency in the licence allocation process for sports betting
licences.84 In the second reference, the operator argued that the betting monopoly itself was in
breach of EU law.85 Ultimately, following the CJEU’s decision to refer the case back to the
national courts, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands held in Ladbrokes Better & Gaming Ltd
77
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v Stichiting de Nationale Sporttotalisator (Ladbrokes) that the monopoly-based regime was
compatible with EU law.86 However, the Council of State in a follow-up March 2011
Ladbrokes decision held that the lack of a transparent licence allocation mechanism was
unjustifiable and thus breached EU law.87 This decision has resulted in many challenges to
existing licensing regimes. Moreover, it opened the gateway for operators to challenge the very
existence of the monopoly before national courts. Arguably, these challenges posed an
existential threat to part of the established order of the national gambling market and ultimately
resulted in the introduction of “prioritization criteria” by the Dutch Gaming Authority in June
2012. These criteria indicated that enforcement action would not be taken against online
gambling operators as long as they avoided certain specific actions.
The Gaming Authority prioritized enforcement efforts against those providing games
of chance via websites available in the Dutch language, and/or via websites which have a “.nl”
URL extension, and/or engage in radio, television, or print-media advertising directed towards
the Netherlands.88 Compliance with the criteria did not render the underlying offer legitimate
and the criteria paid no regard to whether an offer was regulated by another jurisdiction. This
approach was seen as a means to manage the transitional period until the introduction of the
new licensing regime, estimated at about twelve months, yet six years have elapsed at the time
of writing . Various tweaks were made to the approach, such as the publication of the Gaming
Authority’s “Enforcement Policy” in 2016, which expanded upon previous references to a riskbased approach to enforcement.89 The policy states that several factors will be considered as to
whether enforcement action should be taken, including whether there are large risks for players.
Considerable changes to this approach were introduced on June 1, 2017, including a nonexhaustive list of elements which could be taken into consideration to show that an offer was
targeting the Netherlands.90 Significantly, and seemingly independently of whether any of the
other factors were breached, accepting play from minors became a factor for triggering
enforcement.
Whilst Finland has demonstrated clarity in terms of relying on its existing, and
subsequently merged monopoly-based system to counter unlicensed offers, the Netherlands
has opted to licence private online gambling operators and capture a proportion of the de facto
market. However, by November 2018 the necessary legislative amendments to enable this had
not been adopted, despite the fact that a Bill to that effect which was submitted to parliament
in July 2014.

C. PROTECTING AGAINST HARMFUL EFFECTS
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As Hörnle puts it, “[t]he activity of online gambling presents potentially serious risks for
individuals and for society as large.”91 The most serious risks are gambling addiction, underage
gambling, and crime (e.g. fraud, money laundering). Age restrictions protect minors from the
risks of gambling, but these limitations must be monitored and enforced. Gambling limitations
protect other customers from gambling harms and addiction, and regulations also apply limit
the marketing of gambling offers in order to limit harmful effects.
1. FINLAND
Prevention of gambling harms is a key objective of the Finnish gambling policy. Gambling
became a problem or a “significant social issue” in the beginning of the 2000s.92 At the same
time, the profile of Finnish gambling research changed, as the Finnish Ministry of Social
Affairs and Health commissioned an investigation on Finnish gambling and problem gambling
.93 A prevalence study has been conducted every four years since 2003. Questions on gambling
were also included in other surveys, such as the European School Survey Project on Alcohol
and Other Drugs94 and the School Health Promotion Survey.
The pressure to produce information on Finnish gambling and problem gambling is
substantial. Monitoring and research are statutorily mandated and updated results are
continuously needed in political decision-making.95 The Finnish state depends on the results of
the prevalence studies to justify the gambling monopoly system to the European Commission.
The results may also play a major role in the regulation of gambling, in policy and gambling
operations, as well as in the development of responsible gambling operations.96
Salonen and Raisamo estimated that 124 000 Finns (3.3 percent of the population)
have a gambling problem and 49 000 Finns (1.3 percent of the population) suffer from
gambling addiction.97 According to the results of the Finnish gambling survey of 2015, those
respondents who played online poker, online casino games, and instant lotteries on Finnish and
foreign operators’ sites had the most gambling problems.98 In 2016, the results of the Finnish
Gambling Harm Survey showed that gambling addiction, problem gambling, and at-risk
gambling were more common among Finns who played both online and land-based games than
those who had played either online or land-based games.99 The clients of the Finnish Gambling
Julia Hörnle, “Social policy and regulatory models” in Julia Hörnle & Brigitte Zammit, Cross-border Online
Gambling Law and Policy (Cheltenham & Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2010) 10 at 11.
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98
Ibid.
99
See Anne Salonen et al., “Rahapelikysely 2016: Rahapelaaminen, rahapelihaitat ja rahapelien markkinointiin
liittyvät mielipiteet Uudellamaalla, Pirkanmaalla ja Kymenlaaksossa” (Helsinki: Department of Health and
Welfare, 2017).
91

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2018

114

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 30 [2018], Art. 6

Clinic, who had played both online and land-based games, suffered from numerous gamblingrelated harms in comparison to those who had played either online or land-based games.100
Since December 2017, new limits have been established on the site of the Finnish
operator, Veikkaus, in order to prevent increased online gambling problems. These limits have
been stipulated by decree (2017/1424) by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior.101 Gamblers
must create daily and monthly limits relating to the transfers between their bank account and
their gaming account. Gamblers can exclude themselves from online gambling completely,
from a specific online game or from a game group. No money transfer is possible between
midnight and 6 a.m. A “panic button” prevents gambling for 24 hours. Gamblers must create
limits to instant games: at most €1000 daily and €2000 monthly. The total deposit on the
gaming account is €20 000. Once an hour, the gambler is notified of the time spent gambling
online.102
All online and offline games are prohibited to minors. Online gambling is possible
only after registration and the operator must verify each customer’s age from their social
security number. Nevertheless, previous studies on youth gambling have indicated that
underage gambling has not completely disappeared in Finland. 103 To tackle this issue, there is
a new protective age limit of 23 years, which means staff in gambling venues (e.g. casino and
arcades) and other business premises offering gambling (e.g. supermarkets, kiosks and petrol
stations) must ask every young-looking person for identification showing their age ID.
Veikkaus will install an identification feature on slot machines in the near future.
2. THE NETHERLANDS
Various reports in the Netherlands have addressed the prevalence of negative consequences
associated with participation in games of chance. A study dating from 2011 found that 64
percent of all respondents were recreational players, 0.68 percent of the population were at risk
of addiction104 and 0.15 percent were problem gamblers.105 In 2016, the Gaming Authority
stated that there were approximately 20,300 problem gamblers and 92,000 at risk gamblers in
the Netherlands, which put the Netherlands on par with or below other European countries.106
The explanatory memorandum to the Bill amending the Betting and Gaming Act and the
Betting and Gaming Tax Act , which will introduce a licensing regime for online games of
chance, notes that a licensing system is required as to prevent those at risk of addiction from
developing into problem gamblers.107
The Gaming Authority notes that the expected increase in those participating in online
gambling does not automatically mean that the number of at risk and problem gamblers will
increase. This is attributed to the fact that future licensees will have to comply with strict
100
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regulatory requirements designed to prevent problem gambling. Furthermore, technological
solutions, such as a central database of excluded players, will also mitigate the potential for
increased problem gambling.108 Nevertheless, the Gaming Authority also notes that it is
difficult to predict future developments on this front because the market is already fairly mature
and thus the impact of the arrival of legalised offers and advertising could have relatively less
impact than would otherwise be the case.
Nevertheless, as the legislative process remains sluggish, the lack of a regulatory
regime can hurt consumers. This is demonstrated by a case where a player sought to rely upon
the illegality of an online gambling offer in the Netherlands in order reclaim his losses of
€178,088 from an operator licensed in Malta. The operator was providing services in the
Netherlands in breach of the prohibition on unlicensed games of chance. Ultimately, the Court
of Appeal held that over time the prohibition on unlicensed games of chance has lost the effect
of rendering contracts for such games void or voidable. The erosion of this effect was attributed
to various factors, including: the numerous opportunities to participate in such offers, the lack
of consistent enforcement measures on the part of the government, the lack of a demonstrable
intent to take measures against operators compliant with the prioritisation criteria, and the
passage of the Bill amending the Betting and Gaming Act by the House of Representatives in
July 2016 which would perpetuate the activity in question. All in all, such an offer could not
be considered as socially undesirable, illegal, or criminal given that the Gaming Authority had
previously recognised the operator’s compliance with the prioritisation criteria. 109
While the Bill amending the Betting and Gaming Act is designed to protect
consumers, they are left in something of a no-man’s land pending regulation. Resistance to
licensing online operators pits the protection of consumers through local licencing and
regulation against other stakeholders who wish to prevent international operators from
obtaining licences at the local level
In conclusion, both Finland and the Netherlands have decided to restrict cross-border
movement of gambling services, with Finland opting for a monopoly-based system and the
Netherlands is heading towards a licensing system. As online gambling is seen as a potentially
harmful activity, consumer protection regulations are mandatory for every operator providing
online gambling services in the two EU Member States. Gamblers in both jurisdictions gamble
on foreign sites that are considered illegal in accordance with domestic law. Nevertheless,
gambling abroad is not forbidden for Finns, whereas in the Netherlands knowingly
participating in unlicensed games of chance is prohibited. While the Netherlands is still
preparing the licensing system and developing the robust measures to successfully protect
consumers, Finland is already focused on maintaining the monopoly system by channeling the
demand towards national providers of online gambling with responsibility tools, limits, and the
possibility of self-exclusion.

IV. MULTIPLE STREAMS ANALYSIS
We apply the Multiple Streams Approach to our analysis of the Finnish and Dutch cases. In
the Dutch case, the analysis starts from the end of 2000s, when plans to regulate online
gambling started to take shape. In the Finnish case, we start our analysis from the 2010s, when
108
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RAY started its online casino and the three national operators’ monopolies were given legal
status.
1. FINLAND
Finland may be the last fortress of gambling monopolies in Northern Europe.110 Denmark
opened its gambling market to online gambling companies in 2012; there are no limits on the
number of licenses to be granted, but the companies must fulfill certain conditions stipulated
in the Danish Gambling Act.111 Norway and Iceland are not EU Member States, but their
position on online gambling is an interesting contrast to Finland’s. Norway prohibited banks
and other financial institutions from funding foreign gambling companies in 2010. These
companies could also be charged if they accepted bets from Norwegians.112 In Iceland, the Law
on Lotteries states that a license to operate lottery or tombola can be granted to a company
established in the European Economic Area, and for the purpose of obtaining money for public
benefit in Iceland.113
Figure 2 focuses on the 2010s, when the national gambling companies, Veikkaus,
RAY, and Fintoto, saw their gambling monopolies legalized by amendment of the Lotteries
Act.114 It was an important step in the consolidation of the monopoly system. Finnish
prevalence studies from 2011 and 2015 indicate that most Finns believe a gambling system
based on monopoly is the best way to reduce gambling harms.115 But in 2011, those respondents
who had gambled online, especially those who had gambled on foreign unlicensed sites, did
not share the argument of the monopoly being the best option in reducing gambling harms.116
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Figure 2. The case of Finland in relation to online gambling
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Finland seems to suffer from a “cultural lag” as it is unable to develop a regulatory framework
that would enable it to respond to the new challenges and risks posed by the complex and evershifting marketplace.117 For several years now, Finnish gambling policy has focused on
channeling demand towards domestic online sites, Veikkaus, RAY, and Fintoto, which have
been represented as more secure than foreign online sites. These online sites merged into one
in spring 2018.
According to the Finnish prevalence study of 2015, a smaller proportion of the
population gambled online through foreign-based sites than national sites.118 Nevertheless,
foreign-based operators reach the Finnish population through various media channels like
foreign TV channels, radio, internet, and the social media. The presence of the foreign-based
gambling operators is a political issue and until recently there has not been any legislative
means available to tackle the issue. Yet there has been a need to address online gambling
marketing on the radio as that was in breach of the Lotteries Act. A new government proposal
(82/2017) states that the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority cannot take into
account a former breach against the Lotteries Act of a licensee applying for a renewal of short
broadcasting license or a radio license.119
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The 2013 Resolution of the European Parliament on online gambling played a major
role in how Finland saw the future of its gambling monopoly, but also how online gambling
should be operated in the country. The future of the gambling monopoly system had been
discussed on the parliamentary level. The Finnish Ministry of the Interior assigned a committee
to consider alternative systems that could replace the current one. The European Parliament
recognized that “online gambling may involve a greater risk of addiction than traditional offline
gambling, owing, inter alia, to the increased ease of access and the absence of social control”
and added:
on these grounds, certain internal market rules—including the
freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and
the principle of mutual recognition—do not preclude Member
states from determining their own additional measures for the
protection of players.120
The resolution of the European Parliament created a “policy window” that started an important
process in Finland. The merger of the three national gambling companies is a “policy output”,
which has consolidated Finland’s monopoly-based gambling policy. The two different
alternative models of the gambling system were: first, the merger of Veikkaus (as the former
Finnish Lotteries’ company) and RAY (the Slot Machine Association) leaving Fintoto (the
horse betting company) as an independent gambling company or second, the merger of all three
national gambling companies. The latter model prevailed and the new state-owned gambling
company started operations under the name Veikkaus on January 1, 2017. This policy output
emphasizes the fact that Finland makes political decisions within the EU context respecting
EU legislation, but unlike some other European countries, Finland prioritizes the maintenance
of the gambling monopoly system.
Before the merger of the three national companies could happen, the Prime Minister’s
Office assigned a company, NAG Oy, to conduct an independent economic analysis of the two
models. The Ownership Steering Department of the Prime Minister’s Office concluded that the
economic benefits provided by the merger of the three gambling companies would be
substantial, but the benefits from the development of online gambling operations by the new
gambling company would be even more important. The Ownership Steering Department also
stated that this merger would result in the best operational development, efficient control of
gambling operation, efficient steering of the new company, coordination of the gambling
proceeds, and success in online gambling markets.
The policy entrepreneurs, who have contributed to the “policy outputs”, are Finnish
and European stakeholders (e.g. officials, members of the Finnish and the European
Parliament), working groups assigned by the Finnish Ministry of the Interior, and the
representatives of the three national gambling companies and their beneficiaries.
2. THE NETHERLANDS
Concrete plans to regulate online gambling were first made in 2008. It was proposed that the
land-based casino monopolist, Holland Casino, would obtain a three-year online monopoly.121
Although the House of Representatives approved the necessary legislative changes, the Senate
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rejected them. Opposition arose to the idea of the state becoming directly involved in offering
online gambling while other members of the Senate opposed the lack of competition inherent
in the proposed approach. EU law considerations also arose, with one member of the Senate
stating that they would not support the bill because “although [it was] perhaps not the most
important issue [the bill] would probably generate more problems than the current law” as a
general prohibition could more easily be justified under EU law than a monopoly-based
system.122
Following the defeat of such plans, a Report was commissioned and completed in
August 2010.123 In the context of a traditionally restrictive approach to the provision of
gambling, the report suggested that any legalization of online gambling should be limited to
channelling existing demand into the regulated offer, like poker. Subsequent plans to reform
Dutch gambling were introduced in March 2011, whereby the relevant Secretary of State
informed Parliament of his intention to introduce a regulatory regime for online gambling and
ensure that the entire regulatory regime, including the licensing regime for land-based offers,
complied with EU law. In doing so, the Secretary of State recognized that a substantial de facto
market already prevailed in the Netherlands without regulatory oversight at the national level.
The current online gambling bill was formally submitted to the House of
Representatives in July 2014, and the accompanying explanatory memorandum estimates the
size of the de facto market as between 257,000 and 565,000 players.124 The bill seeks to provide
an appropriate and attractive offer on the basis of an approach led by demand, whereby 80
percent of the overall market will be provided by locally licensed operators. Various factors
are offered to illustrate the need for regulation: the borderless character of the internet, resident
demand, rapid technological developments, and that enforcement alone will not suffice. It
recognises that the threat posed by gambling addiction cannot be countered without a licensing
regime, which can also protect consumers, combat fraud and collect gambling tax revenues as
players would be obligated to declare their winnings.
The bill also clearly establishes that responsibility for avoiding the negative
consequences associated with gambling are spread across various actors. Operators and players
are expected to take responsibility for being aware that games of chance carry specific risks.
Moreover, operators will be subject to an extensive duty of care and accompanying
requirements designed to protect consumers against risks associated with excessive
participation. The government considers its role to be providing a regulatory framework which
considers the specific risks associated with gambling and, in particular, regarding those who
are more vulnerable to these risks.
Under the bill, licenced operators must require players to set limits to their play,
provide players with information about gambling addiction each time a player logs on, as well
as post links to addiction treatment options in the Netherlands. Under the aforementioned
extensive duty of care, the operator will be required to contact players that exceed their limits,
for example, via online chat. The bill also intends to create a central database of excluded
players, against which licenced online gambling operators, land-based casinos, and slot
122
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machine operators will have to cross-check their players. Secondary legislation will require
that operators inform individual players who meet criteria suggesting possible problems about
the possibility of voluntarily entering the self-exclusion database . However, should an operator
have grounds to consider that an individual’s behaviour is likely to cause harm to the player or
his/her family, then the Gaming Authority must be alerted. The regulator can then decide
whether an individual should be entered into the central database of excluded players.
Figure 3. The case of the Netherlands in relation to online gambling
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The European Commission has played a significant role in focusing attention on the
potential infringement of EU law by the Dutch regulatory regime. The Commission first sent
an official request for information to the Netherlands in April 2006, regarding land-based sports
betting (whereby the regulatory regime permits the incumbent operator to offer its services via
the internet, whilst not qualifying it as internet or remote gambling). This was followed by the
next stage of the infringement procedure, a letter of formal notice, in February 2008.125 The
Commission stated that “the current Dutch gambling policy is expansive and the licence holder
(De Lotto) is involved in encouraging citizens to participate, via new penetrating and
aggressive distribution channels, in new gambling – with at least an equal risk of addiction to
more traditional games of chance.126 This demonstrates that the restriction in question does not
contribute to limiting gambling activities in a “consistent and systematic manner.” Indicative
125
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of the blurred division between online and land-based gambling in parliamentary discourse,
during a hearing in the House of Representatives on the bill in May 2015 a representative of
the European Commission noted that Brussels was losing patience with the sluggish progress,
and threatened to restart infringement proceedings if changes did not materialize.127 Whilst the
infringement proceeding against the Netherlands was closed in 2017, along with those against
many other Member States, the decision to do so was unrelated to the question of whether the
various national regulatory regimes were EU law compliant. Instead, the Commission decided
that domestic courts provided a more efficient means to handle complaints in this sector. This
does not mean that Member States have been freed from the need to comply with EU law when
regulating their gambling markets. Yet pressure will no longer be placed on the domestic
legislative process due to probing from the European Commission.
The bill is the key policy output to date, yet by spring 2018 it still had not been tabled
for debate in the Senate. Secondary legislation, which will provide more practical details on
the regulatory regime, will be published for consultation, providing another opportunity for
policy entrepreneurs to provide input and views to the Ministry. Thus, the key output, a
complete and comprehensive regulatory regime for online gambling, has yet to be achieved
and the locally licensed market may not open until 2020. Even then, this policy output will not
be final; reviews of the performance of the regulatory regime have been built into the design
of the policy regime. It would be unwise to anticipate that the design of the regulatory regime
will remain static. Extensions and alterations are expected as policy entrepreneurs respond to
the new regulatory regime.
The Ministry of Justice and Security plays a key role as a “policy entrepreneur” as
they are able to establish Dutch gambling policy. This role is shared with the Ministry of
Finance in the sense that Finance sets the rate of taxation, but taxation should not undermine
the achievement of gambling policy’s core regulatory objectives. Given the division of
competencies, the Gaming Authority has perhaps had to take something of a backseat.
Nevertheless, its past and current policies on enforcement against online gambling operators
without a licence, and the consequences thereof, have shaped parliamentary discourse on the
bill.128 Once the regulatory foundations are laid, the most significant policy outputs can be
expected, building upon the work of the Ministry by regulating the allocation of licences and
the effective supervision of the new licence holders. Parliament continues to formulate its
regulation regime by making amendments and motions to the bill.129 There is considerable
resistance to the possibility that operators who have been on the market without a local licence
(that is, illegally) will be able to receive one under the new regime.130
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V. SIMILARITIES AND DISCREPANCIES
At first glance, the Finnish and the Dutch cases seem to have very little in common. The Dutch
Gambling Act of 1964 had three main objectives: channeling the domestic demand for
gambling towards legal opportunities, protection of customers, and prevention of gambling
addiction.131 On the other hand, the Finnish Lotteries Act of 1965 established that “raising
revenues by taking advantage of people’s desire to gamble is allowed only in limited volume
and exclusively to raise funds for charity or to support non-profit activity.”132 Yet similarities
can be found. Prior to emergence of the internet, the regulation of gambling in both jurisdictions
was largely characterised by monopoly-based supply, with the difference being the number of
market segments.
Finland and the Netherlands diverge in how they are responding to securing national
objectives with the arrival of online gambling. Finland elected to maintain its monopoly-based
supply, extending it to the online sphere and subsequently consolidating its various offline
monopolies into a single overarching state-owned monopolist in anticipation of operational
benefits from a single provider. Monopoly-based supply was considered to be the most
appropriate way to counter gambling harms, yet this does not mean the Finnish market is
impervious to cross-border offers (for instance, there are indications that some consumers
prefer offers originating out of the state). Attention was focused on channeling demand to
domestic sites, and in this regard Finland and the Netherlands share a point in common.
However, with the pending bill, the Netherlands seeks to channel 80 percent of
demand to locally licensed online operators. Despite the state lottery’s takeover of a private
non-profit operator, the trend in regulation reform is one of less government involvement in
games of chance, like the decision to privatize the casino sector. Moreover, the Netherlands
has not sought to extend their offline approach to the online market. The offline market is more
fragmented compared to Finland and a market-oriented approach has been chosen . However,
given lengthy turmoil and delay related to the bill, a substantial de facto market prevails in the
absence of legal means to extend local regulatory objectives and standards to the online
gambling market.
Whilst these EU Member States have taken different regulatory paths, these paths
crossed when the regimes came under the scrutiny of the European Commission in 2006.133
Both regulatory regimes triggered preliminary references to the Court of Justice of the
European Union (“CJEU”). These references did not directly challenge the absence of an online
regime but did question the offline regime’s compliance with EU law. EU law certainly acted
as a catalyst for debate and provided a platform for foreign stakeholders to place pressure upon
domestic regulatory regimes. From the perspective of private operators, this has had greater
purchase in the Netherlands than Finland.
To a degree, the protection which the two regimes will offer against the potential
excesses of gambling will depend upon whether it is possible to channel consumer demand to
the locally licensed supply. The Netherlands chose a licensing regime, capturing the supply
Act and some other laws relating to the organization of remote games of chance. Further provisional report from
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side while imposing p regulatory preferences on gambling suppliers. This approach seemed
preferable to the gargantuan task of enforcement. Finland elected to consolidate its monopoly
structure, relying upon enforcement of the rules, but also recognising that an attractive offer is
a necessary part of the regulatory mix. To capture demand, both regimes will need to enable
offers which reflects consumer preferences and rely upon enforcement. The magnifying glass
of EU law will require that the new regulatory regime for online gambling in the Netherlands
does not introduce any incompatible restrictions, while Finland cannot afford to contradict the
objectives on which the state monopoly is founded. Compliance with EU law is an ongoing
process, requiring horizontal consistency as well. The pressure from unlawful gambling, the
harms of gambling and EU law will be ever present factors requiring continuous assessment.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, our main goal has been to find answers to our research question: why did Finland
and the Netherlands decide to take different political and legislative paths regarding regulation
of online gambling? Ultimately, both EU Member States seek the same objectives: to protect
consumers from the excesses of gambling in part through reducing the presence of unlicensed
operators on their respective national markets. Finland has responded to the pressures of EU
law by swimming against the tide and sticking with a monopoly system, while the Netherlands
has opted to permit private parties into the market under strict licensing conditions.
These plans reflect the Netherlands’ earlier departure from the alibi model of
regulation. Current regulatory proposals emphasize the ability of a licensing regime to capture
existing demand (“channelization”) and thus avoid illegal markets, but otherwise there is little
reflection of the other tenets of the alibi model. Indeed, there will be no specific restrictions
on the generation of private profit and the ensuing taxation revenues will be destined for state
coffers. In line with the risk model, the planned regulatory reforms concentrate on tackling the
risks of gambling related addiction by developing and extending national regulatory
preferences and standards in this area. Given long-standing opposition to the law and apparent
political indecisiveness, the significant delays in passing the bill arguably undermines the
achievement of its public policy objectives. One cannot help but wonder whether the lack of
political progress means those who would receive protections under the proposed legislation
are left unduly out in the cold.
Kingma’s theorization of gambling regulation in the Netherlands has inspired other
researchers, who have modified the regulatory models to fit the Finnish case. With the
Foucauldian concept of the “dispositif", Matilainen tries to depict social changes in a historical
continuum.134 Instead of differentiating models, Matilainen analyzes changes in gambling
regulation within dispositifs and has added the concepts of gender, class, and gambling space
in her analysis. According to Matilainen, there are three dispositifs: the “prohibition
dispositive”, the “common good dispositive” and the “risk dispositive.” These social changes
are also related to gambling through discourses and practices. 135 Within the Finnish context,
the commercialization of gambling has intensified due to the introduction of online
134
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gambling.136 The internet has changed the temporal and the spatial organization of gambling
and this has had an impact on gambling routines, gambling spaces, and sociality of gambling.137
Matilainen claims that addiction is a by-product of the risk dispositif.138 Given the historical
mix of state-backed, private non-profit making, and profit making operators in the Netherlands,
it will be interesting to see whether similar temporal and spatial shifts arise following the
licensing of online gambling in the Netherlands; more space for commercial enterprise will
coincide with the application of national standards and preferences to an existing online
gambling market.
Finland and the Netherlands have different political priorities and corresponding
strategies in relation to online gambling, despite a shared ambition to channel demand towards
domestic gambling providers. They represent different regulatory models and their policy
windows differ. It remains to be seen which providers are interested in the Dutch market once
it becomes clear how the regulatory landscape will lie, and conversely, how Dutch gamblers
take to new locally licensed offers, such as short odds bingo.139 Finland, on the other hand, not
ready to change its regulatory system, chose to compete against unlicensed gambling
operations with a brand new national gambling company. Finland’s approach serves to protect
gamblers from developing gambling problems, with mandatory limits and responsible
gambling tools, and to protect local online gambling operations from unlicensed competition
over the proceeds of gambling.
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